On 17 May 2026 the World Health Organization (WHO) Director‑General, invoking paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the International Health Regulations (2005), declared the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), while concluding it does not meet the IHR definition of a pandemic emergency. The DG issued “WHO advice” to States Parties and, after convening the IHR Emergency Committee on 19 May 2026, the Committee endorsed the PHEIC determination and stressed the need for context‑sensitive response measures in what it called an extremely challenging operational environment.
As of 22 May 2026 the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk as “Very high” for the DRC and “High” for Uganda. Uganda had reported two confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) cases linked epidemiologically to areas of transmission in the DRC, and no onward transmission among contacts had been documented by that date. The epidemic is driven by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), an Orthoebolavirus for which there are currently no approved therapeutics or vaccines; candidate treatments and vaccines are under consideration for trials, but control depends now on strengthened public‑health measures.
WHO’s temporary recommendations call on affected countries to rapidly activate emergency management and coordination mechanisms, declare national or subnational health emergencies where appropriate, and establish or reinforce emergency operations centres under senior authority to coordinate surveillance, contact tracing, infection prevention and control (IPC), laboratory testing, case management and dignified burials. Countries must keep up‑to‑date registers of alerts, maintain line lists of suspected, probable and confirmed cases, and monitor contacts daily for 21 days from last exposure.
Community engagement and trust building are central to the guidance: health authorities should work closely with religious and traditional leaders, community health workers and local volunteers to promote early detection, safe isolation, contact monitoring and culturally sensitive burial practices, and to provide food, water and psychosocial support when movement restrictions are applied. Laboratory capacity should be decentralised where possible, with RT‑PCR testing scaled up and alerts investigated within 24 hours; WHO specifically notes that the GeneXpert platform cannot detect BDBV. Health facilities must receive continuous IPC training, adequate PPE and mechanisms for reporting and managing health‑worker exposures.
WHO advises establishing dedicated isolation and treatment centres, safe patient transfer and waste‑disposal protocols, survivor follow‑up services (including clinical care and sexual‑health counselling), and measures to preserve essential health services. Border and travel guidance includes enhanced surveillance at ground crossings, exit screening at points of departure (questionnaire and temperature checks), and restricting travel by suspected or confirmed cases and their contacts except for medical evacuations; WHO did not recommend suspending flights or denying entry at the time these recommendations were issued. Research priorities include validating field PCR platforms, launching ethically approved clinical trials for therapeutics and vaccines, and expediting regulatory and ethics reviews to enable data sharing and equitable access.
WHO asks all States Parties to report quarterly on progress and challenges in implementing these temporary recommendations using a standardized reporting tool.
Original Source: https://www.who.int/news/item/22-05-2026-first-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-epidemic-of-ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-uganda-2026-temporary-recommendations
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Publish Date: 2026-05-22 23:55:00
